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Introduction  
Almost five years have passed since the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s government and Iraqis are 
still waiting for the better life promised by President George W. Bush in his speech hours before 
the invasion. Two days before the commencement of the military operations in Iraq, President 
George W. Bush addressed the Iraqi people with the following message: 
“Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. 
If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your 
country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and 
medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new 
Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against 
your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture 
chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.”[1] 
If history has a tendency to repeat itself, this is one case of such tendency. On 23 November, 
1920, “Sir Percy Cox read in Arabic a proclamation which included the following statement of 
policy:  
“The British Government has now occupied Basra, but though a state of war with the Ottoman 
Government still prevails, yet we have no enmity or ill-will against the population, to whom we 
hope to prove good friends and protectors. No remnant of Turkish administration now remains in 
this region. In place thereof the British flag has been established, under which you will enjoy the 
benefits of liberty and justice, both in regard to your religious and secular affairs.”[2] 
While President Bush’s message does not express the imperialist tone of Cox’s statement, the 
two share one thing in common: none of their promises in a better future for Iraqis were positively 
fulfilled.  
The United States’ efforts to stabilize Iraq for the past years have been always described as 
“progress.” The quality of progress was finally defined by Ambassador Crocker in the following 
terms: “the cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq is 
upwards, although the slope of that line is not steep.”[3] In plain English, the progress is there, but 
hardly enough to get the job done. Meanwhile, a growing number of Iraqis feel some unhealthy 
nostalgia to the bad old days. This article aims at identifying the reasons for the lack of adequate 
progress and suggesting some measures to give the trajectory a better direction. This task cannot 
be adequately accomplished without providing a critique of the current U.S. policy in Iraq and the 
alternative “plans” suggested by some critics of this policy.  
Three plans compete for the chance to replace the official policy in Iraq: a simple “cut and run” 
plan which calls for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops as soon as possible and let the Iraqis sort out 
their differences; a simple division of Iraq into three autonomous regions, as it was in the Ottoman 
days; and the Biden Plan, which is, in spite of its shortcomings, the most coherent of the three. 
This article, for obvious reasons, will ignore the first two plans and discuss the Biden Plan and the 
official U.S. policy in Iraq. It will also propose an alternative plan for the post-surge era. 
The Biden Plan  
Senator Joseph Biden has devoted a lot of time and energy to the Iraqi problem. He is correctly 
described as “probably the best-informed member of Congress on Iraq.”[4] As his plan shows, he 
does grasp many of the current problems in the country and provide reasonable ways to solve 
some of them. But the plan also fails to recognize many essential problems that would call for 
more than “five points” to solve the Iraqi crisis. Simply put, the Biden plan rests on a political pillar 
(the first point), which delegates most of the power to the regions and leaves a skeletal national 
government with jurisdiction on the “common interests.”[5] This point maybe scrutinized on 
several levels. First, the federal government will not be able to keep Iraq together. The Senator’s 
distinguished career must have taught him that there is more to a viable federal government that 
what he allows the Iraqi national government in the first point of his plan. Second, the proposal to 
have a Shi’i region, a Sunni region and a Kurdish region is easier on paper than in reality—one of 
the problems of the Biden plan is that it is heavily charged with sectarian and racial language that 
Iraqis try to avoid as they articulate the foundations of their political system. There are millions of 
Iraqis who will end up in a region not controlled by their own sectarian or ethnic groups. If this 
plan, as the Senator presents it, designed to end sectarian violence, there no solution to be 
expected from federalism, because most of the sectarian and ethnic violence takes place in the 
mixed cities and not in the homogeneous ones like Najaf, Arbil and Tikrit. Third, the regions are 
not able to handle all of the power that will be given to them under the Biden plan. Until 2003, 
most of the Iraqi cities never had a governor, a mayor or a chief of police of their own. The regime 
of Saddam Hussein sent those from Baghdad or the few towns loyal to him. The catastrophic 
performance of the local governments in the past four years speaks volumes about where this 
plan will lead. The latest report submitted to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (October 2007) states that “Iraq’s provincial councils have limited ability to 
manage and sustain infrastructure projects, and they are not sufficiently budgeting for operations 
and maintenance requirements.”[6] Until those local governments are enabled to act proficiently, 
it would be irresponsible to give them a sweeping control over the destiny of millions of Iraq’s 
citizens.  
The second point calls for equitable distribution of revenues. This is the right thing to do, but the 
plan needs some adjustment. A guaranteed 20 percent of “all present and future revenues” for 
Sunnis should be made after taking into consideration the central government’s expenses. 
Otherwise, the other two groups end up financing the state from their own portions. Additionally, 
the second point in the plan seems to worry about the Ba’athists, but gives no attention 
whatsoever to their victims who outnumber them more than ten to one. In this sense, the plan will 
replace a small angry minority of former oppressors with a large furious majority of victims. The 
Senator, in spite of his obvious effort to follow the situation in Iraq, perhaps is not aware that a 
vast majority of the victims of the past regime are still victims in the new regime. To reward their 
former oppressors and tell them (the victims) to simply “get over it,” will create a political and 
moral quagmire the consequences of which can be catastrophic.  
The third and fifth points present good suggestions concerning the engagement of Iraq’s 
neighbors, politically and financially, in solving Iraq’s problems. Unfortunately, most of those are 
unrealistic at the present time. First, the regional states are not operating in harmony with one 
another, because they have mutually exclusive goals in Iraq. Also, some of them are on the worst 
terms with the United States, which gives them no incentive to cooperate. Indeed, even the U.S. 
‘allies’ seem to pursue their own interests, which at times can be to the opposite of what the 
United States tries to accomplish. Further, the plan does not explain how to make those “oil-rich 
Gulf states” give money to Iraq. Until now, Kuwait insists on collecting all of the compensations 
for Saddam’s invasion and occupation in 1990-1991, much less provide any financial aid, and 
Saudi has only agreed to give Iraq loans in addition to some unsubstantial aid. Saudi Arabia still 
wants Iraq to pay the loans from the Iraq-Iran War, some $15 to $18 billion. Although they agreed 
recently to forgive 80 percent of the loans, they did claim that unpaid interest has brought the 
amount owed to $39 billion.[7] In this case, Iraq will still have to pay half of the original debt. As 
the Iraqi minister of Finance, Baqir Jabr, pointed out, “Saudi Arabia has also failed to deliver on a 
long-standing pledge to provide $1 billion in new aid.”[8] Additionally, some Gulf States, including 
Saudi Arabia, have undermined the stability of Iraq. In the words of one U.S. representative, the 
Saudi government shows “tacit approval of terrorism.”[9]  
The fourth point calls for a withdrawal and re-deployment of “almost all U.S. forces from Iraq by 
2008.” As it will be discussed shortly, this goal is not realistic, given the status of Iraq’s security 
forces. The plan does not call on giving Iraq a credible military and police to be able to defend 
itself in a very bad neighborhood, the Middle East. It calls for keeping a small number of troops, 
around 20,000, “to strike any concentration of terrorists, help keep Iraq's neighbors honest and 
train its security forces.” If 150,000 U.S. troops were deemed insufficient to keep Iraq safe, hence 
the surge, then how could one tenth of that number of troops accomplish this goal?  
Additional critique of the plan must emphasize that the plan makes no mention of corruption, 
which is the second form of terrorism in Iraq, nor does it present any measures to end it. Indeed, 
under the plan corruption is more likely to thrive. Iraq’s provinces need a long process to establish 
the institutions that would ensure accountability and transparency. In 2006, Iraq was placed as 
the second most corrupt country in the world, sharing the same place on the list (160) with 
Myanmar and Guinea, and saved from the worst position by Haiti. This is not likely to change, 
except for to worse, when the 2007 report is announced. Iraq’s 2006 budget was $41 billion and it 
will be $48 billion in 2008, the highest in Iraq’s history. Yet, Iraqis still live in sub-human 
conditions, worse than those of the poorest countries. The only ones who seem to have 
prospered are the politicians and their allies.[10] To put it bluntly, with this level of corruption, all 
of the talk about a strong, stable and democratic Iraq is mere nonsense.  
The United States is, sadly, part of this problem. To be sure, the United States did not introduce 
corruption in Iraq. But the United States has tolerated gross corruption for a higher priority, 
namely so as not to disturb the political process. Hence, a unique opportunity to break away from 
the old system of corruption was missed. From the billions of dollars that simply disappeared 
during the CPA era to the latest revelations of gross corruption cases, the U.S. Government has 
not taken any significant steps to prosecute the offenders, much less use available tools, such as 
the Interpol, to bring fugitive embezzlers to justice. This conduct on part of the U.S. Government 
caused some frustrated members of Congress, like Rep. Henry Waxman, to introduce House 
Resolution 734, accusing the State Department of “abuse of the classification process to withhold 
from Congress and the people of the United States broad assessments of the extent of corruption 
in the Iraqi Government.”[11] This came after the State Department “retroactively classified two 
reports on corruption in Iraq,” that were previously disseminated. The resolution also expressed 
frustration at the State Department for “directing its employees not to answer questions in an 
open forum that call for ‘Broad statements/assessments which judge or characterize the quality of 
Iraqi governance or the ability/determination of the Iraqi government to deal with corruption, 
including allegations that investigations were thwarted/stifled for political reasons.’”[12] The 
resolution was passed in the House of Representatives on October 16, 2007, by an 
overwhelming majority of 395 to 21.[13] This is not about some small matters of petty corruption 
or embezzlement. As Representative Waxman put it, quoting the Head of the Iraqi Commission 
on Public Integrity, Radhi al-Radhi, testifying before Congress, “Corrupt Iraqi officials had stolen a 
staggering 18 billion dollars.”[14] Thirty-one investigators, according to al-Radhi, were 
assassinated to prevent the exposure of those corrupt officials.  
The plan, in Senator Biden’s words, aims to “beef up” the federal arrangement in the Iraqi 
constitution. This is not possible, of course, without a constitutional amendment. Iraqis of all 
groups reject this level of tampering with the constitution. It goes without saying that amending 
the constitution to make it reflect a plan presented by a U.S. senator is in itself a bad plan that 
can only excite the resentment of Iraqis. Iraqi politicians are conveniently racing to criticize the 
Senate vote to endorse the Biden Plan in harsh terms. The leader of one bloc in the Iraqi 
legislature described the vote in the U.S. Senate to pass a non-binding resolution (essentially 
based on the Biden plan) as a move that shows no ethics, taste or any respect to the 
International law, asking the interviewer, “What if the Iraqi legislature passed a similar non-
binding resolution to divide the United States?”[15] 
U.S. Policy: No Good Options  
Setting all diplomatic niceties aside, Ambassador Crocker complained that “[no] Nelson Mandela 
existed to emerge on the [Iraqi] national political scene; anyone with his leadership talents would 
have not survived.” This line was echoed in a speech President Bush gave, saying: “Mandela is 
dead, because Saddam Hussein killed all the Mandelas.”[16] In between, Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice also dwelled on the same theme and attributed the assumed lack of an Iraqi 
Mandela to the fact that “Saddam Hussein killed people, a lot of the leadership of Iraq.”[17] This 
lack of faith in all Iraqis, at the highest level of the U.S. Government, tells the whole story of failing 
to accomplish any substantial political progress in Iraq. In fairness to Ambassador Crocker and 
his superiors in the Government, they are not the first to hold this “Orientalist” view. Faced with 
the same task, Gertrude Bell wrote in 1920: “If only we could manage to install a native head of 
the state.”[18] She went on, a week later, to state that, “The theory is that we’re going to set up a 
government agreeable to all; the drawback [is] that such a government doesn’t exist.”[19] The 
British solution was to import a king, Faisal I, from Mecca. The real problem for the U.S. 
Government is not that an Iraqi Mandela does not exist; the problem is that there is no Faisal—a 
man who is accepted by the Iraqis and, at the same time, poses no threat to U.S. interests in the 
region. Any Sunni Arab or a Kurd will not be accepted by the Iraqis, because they will not agree 
to return to minority rule, which could only be sustained by oppression. Therefore, we are back to 
Ms. Bell’s quandary: “if you’re going to have anything like really representative institutions…you 
would have a majority of Shi’ahs.”[20] This will run against the second criteria since, as far as 
Washington is concerned, any Shi’i leader in Iraq is a priori guilty of being closer to Iran than to 
the United States.  
Given this poverty of choices, the United States has moved in all directions and ended up with no 
particular direction. In the past five years we have seen U.S. support of democracy and its 
antithesis, tribalism; secularism and theocracy; constitutionalism and arbitrary politics; rule of law 
and contempt to the law; de-Ba’athification and re-Ba’athification; disarming the militias and 
tolerating the militias; fighting the insurgents and backing the insurgents; to give only a short list 
of inconsistencies. This experimentalism is directly caused by the lack of faith in the Iraqis and is 
also directly causing the lack of substantial progress in Iraq.  
The drawback in Iraq is that after the military victory that resulted in the removal of a brutal 
dictator, a political victory by replacing him with a decent government did not ensue. Instead, 
factions within the U.S. Government kept their eyes on each other and let the Iraqi ball bounce all 
over the field. Just as Iraqis began to recover from the plunders of Ambassador L Paul Bremer III 
and, following two elections and a constitutional ratification, a fatal setback was set off by 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad’s imposition of a “national unity” government which included 
politicians and parties who stood for anything but national unity. Worse of all, this imposition 
represented the first act to undermine a constitution whose ink was still fresh. As a result, it took 
the Iraqis several months to finally form a government that failed to reflect the constitution or 
national unity. The ministers represent and serve their own parties and social groups first and 
always, on the watch of a prime minister who possessed no actual oversight power on their 
performance—not to speak of the horrific corruption. Once again, Iraqis were sent back to despair 
and forced to embrace their tribes and militias, whose menace was tolerated simply because they 
outperform the incompetent government.  
On January 10, 2007, President Bush said, “The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American 
people—and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done 
everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests 
with me.”[21] This statement was as true then as it was true three years earlier, but it would have 
made a world of difference had it been said in 2003. Part of the problem, of course, was that the 
American people did not actively unveil their judgment on the situation in Iraq in the 2004 election, 
which was interpreted as a mandate for the Iraq policy.  
The U.S. election of 2006 brought several positive changes that gave a chance to correct the Iraq 
policy: the departure of Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, which in turn facilitated the 
appointment of a general who called for more troops; the replacement of Ambassador Zalmay 
Khalilzad, who was resented by many Iraqis for what they perceived as his political bias toward 
the Sunnis;[22] and the first declaration by President Bush that “we’re not winning, we’re not 
loosing,” instead of the over-confident pre-election statement, “Absolutely, we’re winning.”[23] As 
a result, a policy contrary to that of Rumsfeld’s began to take shape. More troops were deployed 
to secure Baghdad and some other hot areas in the past months, which resulted in a significant 
reduction of violence in the city. But, unless true measures are adopted to sustain it, this 
reduction is temporary. Furthermore, it is not enough, as of now, to create a feeling of safety in 
the capital, or any other place in Iraq, because the terrorists are still able to strike at will in any 
place and at any time; and they do.  
Contributing to the general lack of confidence in the future of Iraq’s security is the fact that the 
surge is supposed to end very soon. The post-surge circumstances will not have changed from 
the time before the surge to prevent the return of the terrorists and the criminals to the streets of 
Baghdad. The question that needs to be asked now is, “What is the post-surge plan?” 
The Problem Can Be the Solution  
The security problem in Iraq at this time is the weakness of Iraq’s military and security forces. 
Niceties aside, there is no true commitment on the part of the United States, or anyone else, to 
make Iraq a strong country. Iraqi forces are still untrained, poorly equipped and confused. This 
lack of commitment should not surprise anyone, because Iraq is still a suspect, just like it was in 
Saddam’s days. A strong military, which is what it takes to accomplish true security, is not on the 
immediate agenda.  
In his recent testimony before Congress, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey argued that Iraq should have 
the number of troops it needs, but not more than that.[24] But, what is this number? Initially, it 
was estimated in 2003 that Iraqi forces would be, by 2006, as low as 40,000, excluding the police 
force—hardly enough to secure one Iraqi province. Nevertheless, at that time, Walter Slocombe, 
a senior Coalition Provisional Authority official, “said the new military would theoretically be able 
to defend Iraq from invasion.”[25]  
After the rise of the insurgency, the objective number of military and police was set at 325,000 
(134,700 Military and 188,300 Police). The irksome reality is that Iraq needs four times this 
number in order to achieve stability. Without domestic violence, Saddam Hussein employed a 
military of 400,000 troops in peace time to keep order and deter an outside attack, with the 
flexibility to raise the number to a million in war time. When the number of Saddam’s police, 
security police and other forces are added to the math, it should become clear that the current 
force objectives will never produce security in Iraq without a long-term commitment of foreign 
forces. This is exactly the assessment of Lt. General Dempsey, who said, in a recent interview: 
“For some time Iraq will continue to need assurances from the United States in terms of its 
external security.”[26] The General’s assessment was confirmed by the Declaration of Principles, 
which was agreed to by President George W. Bush and PM Nouri al-Maliki on November 26, 
2007. In the section on security, the first principle stipulates that the United States “provides 
security assurances and commitments to deter any external aggression targeting Iraq and 
violating its sovereignty and its territory, water or space.”[27] As this declaration is a prelude to “a 
formal agreement defining long-term relations between the two nations,”[28] Lt. Gen. Dempsey’s 
statement that not before the end of 2008 that the Iraqi “…force begins to look like that of a fully 
sovereign government,” becomes an understatement of some sort. The national defense of Iraq 
will become the business of the Unites States for quite a while. Iraqi sovereignty will never be 
complete and no future Iraqi government can claim legitimacy and independence, as the 
experience with Britain proved throughout the first half of the 20th century.  
Meanwhile, the plan to handle Iraq’s current military and police deficiency is both misguided and 
dangerous. It is built on outsourcing the job of Iraq’s inadequate troops to the tribes and, in some 
limited cases, the insurgents! Fighting one element of the insurgency by empowering another 
insurgency element is an untenable method of counterinsurgency, especially when both elements 
have the same stated goals: to kill as many Iraqis and Americans as it takes to regain control of 
Iraq. The same can also be said about the empowerment of tribal elements. The tribal sheikhs do 
not put their lives and those of their men on the line because of pro-Americanism or because of 
some Iraqi patriotic sentiments. They do so to enhance their own positions in the constant 
struggle with local rivals over territory and prestige, not to mention personal gains. A similar policy 
of reliance on the tribes brought dire consequences to the Ottomans in the 19th century; it 
exploded in the face of the British administration of Iraq in the early 20th century; and it will lead 
to the same now.  
The objective of “an Iraq that does not constitute a threat to its neighbors” must not be 
understood in pure military terms. Otherwise, the old, threatening, Iraq would be replaced by a 
new Iraq that is constantly threatened by its neighbors. The concept of an Iraq that is at peace 
with its neighbors must be found on a democratic, stable and strong Iraq. The solution is to have 
enough forces in Iraq to end the violence and provide stability. Since a substantial increase of 
U.S. forces is not a possibility, both logistically and politically, the only solution—which also 
happens to be the right one—is to re-institute the military conscription in Iraq. 
Military Conscription in Iraq  
Military conscription in Iraq was mistakenly abolished after the toppling of Saddam’s government. 
It was established by an elected Iraqi parliament in the 1930s and was kept on the books by 
every subsequent government.[29] Re-instating conscription in Iraq will tackle a complex of 
problems in the country. Most importantly, it will provide the number of troops desperately needed 
for the upcoming years. This will reduce the security dependence on U.S. forces, many of whom 
went through three tours of duty, and some are on their fourth tour. Indeed, this is the only viable 
plan for the post-surge period.  
Conscription will also change the current lopsided make-up of the Iraqi forces, wherein the Shi’a 
are over-represented. Consequently, insurgency propagandists brand all Iraqi soldiers and 
officers as “collaborators with the U.S.” or as “militias loyal to the governing parties.” A military 
conscription will undermine this claim and restore the old status of the Iraqi soldier. For once, 
there is a chance for the Iraqi military to be a true national institution in a country with a dire need 
for some institutions that transcend the sects and ethnic groups. This can be done only when the 
military includes all Iraqi groups through a return to conscription. Furthermore, with every recruit 
added to the Iraq forces, the number of Iraqis who join the insurgency, or choose a criminal path 
for economic reasons, will decrease.  
In addition to conscription, a return to the previous laws concerning soldiers’ commitment to their 
units is essential for a successful military in Iraq—in today’s Iraq, “it is not illegal for an Iraqi 
soldier to abandon his unit or go AWOL.”[30] This is why many soldiers simply desert their units 
when asked to fight and, in other cases, insist on serving in a specific location but not elsewhere. 
In May 2006, “dozens of [soldiers in the Anbar province] declared that they would refuse to serve 
outside their home areas.” And a year earlier, “more than 15,000 other Iraqi soldiers and police 
officers deserted, forcing the training effort essentially to start over with new practices designed to 
increase the retention of recruits.”[31] Still, no policy exists to prevent the recurrence of such 
conduct. According to Lt. Gen. Dempsey, of the Iraqi Security Forces that were ordered to 
support the plan to secure Baghdad, “some units didn’t want to fight,” while there was “one case 
where several senior leaders at the lieutenant colonel and major level spoke out against the 
mission [in Baghdad] and advised their soldiers not to deploy,” contributing to other reasons 
behind the loss of 35%-40% of the units’ authorized strength.[32] Iraqis need to confront this flaw 
in there military if they wish to operate independently to provide internal security and/or defend 
their country against an external threat.  
There is, of course, the past history of abusing the conscription law by the previous regimes; 
especially the abuses under Saddam Hussein’s rule. Saddam Hussein engaged in external wars 
for eleven of his twenty-two years in power. Throughout these years, conscripts were kept in the 
service for up to thirteen years,[33] with a pay that was hardly enough to cover the soldier’s 
personal expenses, much less to support a family. When the war was over, veterans were thrown 
out to unemployment and neglect, only to face a recall when another war began. The lives tens of 
thousands of Iraqi men and their families were shattered by this cruel practice. The new 
conscription law must take every measure to prevent such abuse. Additionally, the law needs not 
be permanent. It can be set with an expiration date after seven or ten years and a provision for a 
review by the Iraqi legislators to keep it on the books or end it according to the circumstances. 
A Plan for Iraq 
• The Iraqi Constitution should be sole basis for Iraq’s political and legal processes. Having 
failed to meet its purpose and proven its incompetence, the National Unity Government 
should be replaced with a government consistent with the Iraqi constitution. The Prime 
Minister should choose his ministers and have full authority over them. What Iraq needs 
is a really united and vibrant government in office and a vibrant opposition in and outside 
the parliament. PM Nouri al-Maliki can form such a government and govern for the 
balance of his term.  
• Iraq’s Conscription Law needs to be reinstated and the Iraqi Forces, including the Air 
Force, should be fully equipped and trained to meet the current and future challenges. 
Iraq’s security should not be compromised for the sake of the political process or to 
satisfy some local or regional actors. This is the only realistic way to responsibly withdraw 
the U.S. forces without leaving a vacuum in Iraq.  
• Militias, tribal and religious forces, and all other anti-democratic armed groups should not 
have a place in Iraq. The government must devise a plan to have a monopoly on the 
possession and use of weapons. As the circumstances allow, subsequent laws can be 
enacted to permit reasonable possession and use of arms in a manner that poses no 
threat to law and order.  
• De-Ba’athification must be a legal and a political process. The question needs to be 
addressed at three levels. First, Ba’ath Party members should be accountable for their 
personal conduct rather than their previous association with the Party; second, the 
victims of the Party’s brutality must see justice done by prosecuting known criminals and 
fair compensation for their loss and suffering during the Ba’athist rule; and, third, 
reconciliation may be made with the individuals, but not with the Ba’ath as a party and an 
ideology—the ideology of the Ba’ath Party and any similar form of chauvinism must not 
be permitted in Iraq. All former Ba’ath members can receive political amnesty, as long as 
this does not preclude any victim from pressing charges against anyone of them for 
personal crimes committed during their time in power.  
• There is a need to activate the Iraqi judiciary and respect its independence. No one in 
Iraq can be allowed to escape prosecution, especially high profile criminals and terrorists, 
who are spared for the sake of the “political process.”  
• Corruption in Iraq must be combated with the same determination as the insurgency and 
terrorism. No corrupt politicians or bureaucrats should be spared for any consideration.  
• With the exception of the three Kurdish provinces, federalism in Iraq should be applied 
gradually, starting with the federalism of the governorates. Political and financial powers 
should be given in a progressive way along with extensive training and capacity building 
and the necessary steps to assure transparency and accountability. Once the 
governorates attain the level of maturity as federal unites, they can join each other and 
cluster as larger provinces (aqaleem).  
• The reconstruction of Iraq should be given a higher level of consideration. It must not be 
tied to the “generosity” of the International Community or the regional actors. With a 
budget of $48 billion, Iraq is capable of depending on itself. Any extra contributions 
should be treated as a welcome addition, but not as a sine qua non basis for 
reconstruction. Along with reconstructing Iraq, there is a need to raise the standard of 
living for all Iraqis. Whether they are unemployed, or employed with inadequate pay, too 
many Iraqis do not live with dignity at the present time. This is unacceptable for a country 
with the second oil reserve in the world.  
• Iraqi revenues should be distributed equally among all Iraqis according to a sound and 
transparent fiscal policy. Any oil laws should be made with the consensus of all Iraqi 
groups and crafted by professionals and specialists rather than partisan politicians with 
no knowledge of the long-term consequences of the laws. Iraq’s current vulnerability 
must not be a justification to surrender its wealth to the multi-national corporations.  
• Since none of Iraq’s neighbors can be considered a friend of the Iraqi people, they must 
not be allowed to influence the political process in the country. The more they interfere, 
the harder it is for Iraqis to succeed. While the United States cannot make Iraq’s 
neighbors provide positive assistance, it certainly can deter them from hindering the 
process. This should go for both U.S. foes and allies.  
About the Author 
Abbas Kadhim is Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
This article is a “work in progress;” the views expressed therein are the author’s own and not 
necessarily reflecting those of NPS or Strategic Insights.  
References  
1. White House Press Release, “President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 
Hours,” March 17, 2003.  
2. Arnold T. Wilson, Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914-1917 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1930), 
10-11.  
3. Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
September 11, 2007.  
4. Peter Galbraith, “Make Walls, Not War,” The New York Times, October 23, 2007. 
5. Senator Joseph Biden Press Release, “Iraq: A Way Forward," October 6, 2006. See also, 
Joseph Biden, “A Plan to Hold Iraq Together,” The Washington Post, August 24, 2006, A21.  
6. For details, see the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Quarterly Report to the 
United States Congress for October 30, 2007.  
7. Steven Mufson and Robin Wright, “In a Major Step, Saudi Arabia Agrees to Write Off 80 
Percent of Iraqi Debt,” The Washington Post, April 18, 2007.  
8. Ibid.  
9. Al-Jazeera News, “US: Saudi Arabia destabilizing Iraq,” Al-Jazeera News (Aljazeera.net), July 
29, 2007.  
10. The series of hearings on Iraqi corruption conducted by the House Committee on 
Government Oversight and Reform are very revealing and disheartening.  
11. H. Res. 374, "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the 
withholding of information relating to corruption in Iraq," October 11, 2007.  
12. House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, “House Passes Resolution on Iraq 
Corruption,” October 16, 2007. 
13. Ibid.  
14. Ibid.  
15. Salih al-Mutlak, interview with al-Fayhaa TV, November 30, 2007.  
16. An online clip is accessible on YouTube at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1KGwQ1O88Y (accessed on Nov. 22, 07). Given Mandela’s 
position on the whole Iraq tragedy, it is highly doubtful that the Bush Administration is "literally" 
looking for someone like Mandela.  
17. Text of September 12, 2007 Interview with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on KARN 
with Dave Elswick, posted at the U.S. State Department Website. 
18. Gertrude Bell, a letter to her father on October 3, 1920. Ms. Bell, as she is generally known, 
was the architect of the modern Iraqi state.  
19. Gertrude Bell, a letter to her parents on October 10, 1920.  
20. Gertrude Bell, a letter to her father on October 3, 1920.  
21. “President’s Address to the Nation,” White House Website (Whitehouse.gov), January 10, 
2007. 
22. As Nibras Kazimi noted, “Shia resentment is so acute that the American ambassador to Iraq, 
Zalmay Khalilzad, is referred to as 'Abu Omar' in Iraqi political circles—meaning ‘father of Omar,’ 
with Omar being a quintessentially Sunni name as far as Shias are concerned.” See Nibras 
Kazimi, “’Abu Omar’ vs. the Shias,” The New York Sun, April 12, 2006.  
23. Peter Baker, “U.S. Not Winning War in Iraq, Bush Says for 1st Time,” The Washington Post, 
December 20, 2006. 
24. Lt. General Martin Dempsey’s Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, June 12, 2007.  
25. Patrick Tyler, “AFTER THE WAR: THE NEW ARMY; U.S.-British Project: To Build a Postwar 
Iraqi Armed Force of 40,000 Soldiers in 3 Years,” The New York Times, June 24, 2003. 
26. James Kitfield, “Q &A: Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, More Art Than Science,” National Journal, 
June 8, 2007.  
27. Al-Sabaah Daily, November 26, 2006. 
28. Thom Shanker and Cara Buckley, “US and Iraq to Negotiate Pact on Long-Term Relations,” 
The New York Times, November 27, 2007. 
29. Abbas Kadhim, “Civil-Military Relations in Iraq (1921-2006): An Introductory Survey,” 
Strategic Insights V, no. 5 (May 2006).  
30. Jeremy Sharp, The Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, 
CRS Report for Congress, January 18, 2007. 
31. Nelson Hernandez, “Iraqis Begin Duty With Refusal,” Washington Post, May 2, 2006. 
32. James Kitfield, Op. Cit., “Q &A: Lt. Gen. martin Dempsey, More Art Than Science,” National 
Journal, June 8, 2007. 
33. Conscription in Iraq at the time in question required a service of three years of those without a 
college degree and two years of the holders of a college degree.  
